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consultants for pest information, or they public consultants for pest information, or they This increased information may indicate a reducmay receive it as a service from a governmental tion of periodic application, which would diooperative Extension agency, for example, the Cooperative Extension minish the negative external effects that such Seice nestigation into the supply of inforService.
1 Investigation into the supply of infortreatments have on environmental quality. charactered as a joint mation reveals that it is characterized as a joint Recent research in this area has determined impact commodity. 2 That is, other agricultural the need for pest information (Regev et al.) and producers can utilize the information obtained the rationale for established information markets from a producer who acquires the information (Feder) . Currently, such sources exist through-(the participant) without subtracting from the out the United States, and both public and priparticipant's utility. A nonparticipant may obtain vate consultants supply information to agriculthe participant's information from a county extural producers.
tension agent, by attending extension or other Regev et al. conclude that these unregulated local meetings, or by talking directly to the parmarkets will not yield an optimal allocation of ticipant. Thus, participation by a producer inresources. Information provided to one agriculcreases the information available to nonparticitural producer may be readily applied by another pating producers with regard to optimal timing producer at zero marginal input cost. In an unand application of pesticides. regulated market, this positive external effect is Pest information possesses joint-impact charnot considered in the selling price of the informaacteristics and is also characterized by asymmetion. Thus, in evaluating pest information protry. Participants' information affects nonparticigrams, the benefits received from them may be pants utility, but nonparticipants' actions do not understated. As a result, increased attention is affect participants' utility. This assumption is being placed on accounting for this external efreasonable for a given season if it is assumed that fect (Smith) . This paper investigates the market intraseasonal pest migration between fields is for pest information and discusses whether regunegligible. However, in terms of an interseasonal lated markets would be more efficient than would perspective, a pesticide management program by unregulated markets.
one producer may affect pest population dynamIn the first section, pest information characics or resistance for the region as a whole (Hueth teristics are investigated in order to determine and Regev). Information in this case exhibits a the effects of this input on production. This insymmetrical joint effect. formation will be useful to producers who emPest information obtained by nonparticipants ploy the information (participants), as well as from participants is not directly related to a nonthose who receive a positive external effect participant's production process. The informa-(nonparticipants) from the participating production may not be a perfect substitute for data that ers. Given the characteristics of pest informanonparticipants would have obtained if they were tion, a model is then developed to account for participants, and nonparticipants may discount pest information and risk preference in a prothe available information from participants in ducer's decision function. The final section their utility function. Less discounting results in summarizes the results and explores the implicagreater substitution and degree of jointness. Pest tions of unregulated versus regulated markets for information is also an optional joint-impact pest information, commodity in that the cost of not using it is zero.
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' It is assumed in this paper that private consultants are not agents for pesticide producers. For a discussion of private consultants related to pesticide producers, refer to Feder, Hall. That is, information available by participants can Equation (2) states that the addition to the varipotentially enter nonparticipants utility funcance of 7r given an additional unit of the input x is tions; however, it may not actually do so either equal to the output price squared times marginal because of possible exclusion or avoidance. risk. Price squared (p 2 ) is positive, but the sign of Thus, nonparticipants have the option of using or marginal risk is subject to empirical evaluation; not using participants' information, provided that however, marginal risk is positive for most inputs participants do not attempt to suppress it. (Batra) . IPM is a method designed to encourage producers to purchase pest information as insurance against risk at the expense of pesticides.
PEST INFORMATION MODEL This implies
Incorporating the above characteristics of pest (3) aV(7r)/ax = p 2 (aV(4)/Ox) < 0. information inputs into economic theory yields valuable policy insights for pest management. In
Given that the major motivation for pest ina partial equilibrium framework, individual proformation and pesticide applications is risk reducer's production and cost functions are preduction, agricultural producers would generally sented to analyze the role of prices in pest inforconsider risk in their preference ordering, U(Tr). mation allocation.
Levy and Markowitz demonstrated that the first Profit, 7r, resulting from the application pest two moments of Taylor series approximation information can be defined as closely approximates preference ordering and yields a utility function for U[E(7T)] as
where p is the market price, +(x, z) is the producers production function, x is a (1 by V) vector Thus, the utility of a risk prospect rr is assumed of pest information, z is a (1 by Z) vector of proto be equal to the utility function evaluated at the duction inputs other than information, r is the mean of rT plus the products of the second moprice vector associated with x, and w is the price ment of Tr, the corresponding derivative of the vector associated with z. Assuming that output b utility function, and the inverse factorial. 3 and product price p are stochastically indepen-
The first-order conditions for a maximization dent, the mean of profit is given by of U = U[E(Tr), V(Tr)], assuming that the utility function is quadratic or that rT's are normally dis- (1) E(r)/x =pE()/x -r~. The ratio in the brackets measures the rate of utility substitution between E(rT) and V(r). This is the negative of the slope of an iso-utility curve The E(rT) is thus maximized when the value of in (E V) space or the negative of the risk evaluaexpected marginal product is equal to the input tion differential quotient REDQ (Magnusson) . price.
Substitution of equations (1) and (2) into equaVariance of is expressed as tion (4), assuming perfect competition and rearranging terms, yields
The optimal value of x occurs when the marDifferentiating with respect to x given perfect ginal input cost equals the value of expected competition, V(p) = 0, results in marginal product minus REDQ times price squared and marginal risk. The modification for (2) aV(rT)/0x = p 2 (0V(4)/&x).
profit maximization under certainty is apparent 3 Higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis could be included in the utility function. Incorporating these moments yields U(rr) = U[E(tr)] + U.2[E(7r)]E[7r-E(7r)]2/2 + UL:[E(ur)]E[7r -E(7r)]3/6 + * ' · Higher moments were excluded from the utility function because the first two moments closely approximate the function and the higher moments do not enrich the conclusions drawn from this paper.in equation (5). A producer will attempt to equate mation and producer risk preference. Table 1 input cost to expected marginal product minus a lists four cases of different combinations of cross marginal risk deduction.
input effects (jointness) and risk preference. Given risk aversion on the part of producers,
In the first case, non-jointness and no risk preference are assumed. Thus, a participant will (6) aU/aV(7r) < 0 and aU/0E(rr) > 0, equate marginal input cost to the value of expected marginal product. The nonparticipant will implies REDQ is greater than zero. In addition, not participate at this level of cost, because the given equation (3) ^for the reduction in cost of providing pest information.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Case two introduces risk preference, given non-jointness. In this case, the participant employs pest information beyond the point where Pest information is an optional joint-impact marginal input cost equals value of expected good and, as such, nonparticipants are affected marginal product because of uncertainty. As by a participant's use of a pest information prodr notd pt of the uncertainty regarding gram .
Let . be pest informationinputsobtFeder noted, part of the uncertainty regarding gram. Let pest infor n i t pest nformatrol is a result of genuine random factors, from participants and x" be pest infwhile there is a pormtion that is perceived by the taned from nonparticipants receiving pest inproducer because of insufficient knowledge. formation from participants. Thus a participant These two elements of uncertainty are readily will equate These two elements of uncertainty are readily apparent in equation (5). Marginal risk is the por-
tion of uncertainty that is composed of genuine random factors, whereas REDQ is the perceived That is, the marginal input cost of pest informarandom variation by producers. tion is equated to the expected marginal product If marginal risk is zero, that is, of information minus the marginal risk deduction. However, the nonparticipant receives the aV(0)/9x = 0, pest information at zero marginal input costs. pTt iorm on at zro mr l i t co. then optimal policy would be to equate the mar-'That i, ginal input cost to value of expected marginal 0 = paE(o)/ax" -REDQ [p 2 V(0)/ax"]].
product. Given this marginal risk assumption,
producers should then be made aware of the fact that pest information does not decrease variation Alternative pricing implications result, dein yield. Thus, producers should not purchase pending on the degree of jointness of pest inforadditional units of pest information as insurance against random variation in yields. Instead, if additional management procedures directed to-
ward decreasing variation in yields: for example, In addition, given case two, more producers are likely to participate because of the incentive o < paE(<)/ax" to insure against risk. If the expected marginal _____-REDQ{pV(__/ax "product of participants is equal to the expected marginal product of nonparticipants, aE(p)/ox' participants = with case two, a producer may still participate if aE(O)/x' [ nonparticipants, r = p0E(0)/ax' I participant = then the difference in participation versus nonpEE(/)/ax' nonparticipant, participation is the net marginal risk deduction between participating and nonparticipating probecause of net marginal risk deduction. In this ducers. Again, this case does not result in market case the producer may choose not to participate failure; however, additional pest information is and become a free rider. In the extreme case, this employed here compared to case one because of results in risk preference. Therefore, the need to reduce pest information cost is not as certain in this (7) r pE(o)/Ox' participant case. p0E(0)/0x" I nonparticipant.
A more realistic assumption, case three, is that some degree of jointness exists. That is, the Therefore, producers would generally become greater the degree of jointness, the more the exfree riders. However, for some producers, the pected marginal product of x" deviates from zero.
marginal risk deducin r arition or participationis difFirst, assuming again no risk preference, the ferent from the marginal risk deduction for nonnonparticipant does not participate because r > participation, even given equation (7). Thus the paE(()/&x'. But the nonparticipant does employ net marginal risk deduction in this case distinthe pest information obtained by the participant guishes between those who participate versus at zero marginal cost. Thus, to some degree, those who do not. That is, the reasonfor particimarket failure is present as a result of the effects pation versus nonparticipation is not only a difof wealth distribution. Participants pay for the ference in expected marginal product, but also information, while nonparticipants receive it at differences in risk preference. In effect, particizero cost. Efficiency is obtained when producers pants are purchasing additional insurance versus are charged for information with the result that the nonparticipant. Again given risk preference, marginal input cost equals the value of expected the requirement for governmental intervention marginal product. Because of market failure, this becomes ambiguous. would suggest a governmental institution's entering the market and providing the information to SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS producers at a fixed cost (Haveman; Demsetz; Baumol) . The producers may not agree on the Investigation into the characteristics of pest inquality and quantity of information that should formation reveals that it is a joint-impact combe provided, or on the level of resources devoted modity. Thus for economic efficiency, the possito providing information. To avoid this problem, bility of a regulated market exists. Consideration it has been suggested that a governmental agency of uncertainty, as well as jointness in a procharge each producer at a level equivalent to the ducer's decision with regard to pest information, producer's value of expected marginal product.
leads to the following results: as the degree of Producers with differing marginal products of a jointness and marginal risk tend toward zero, joint-impact good generally may not prefer being generally no market intervention is necessary. exposed to this type of discriminatory moAs pest information becomes more of a jointnopolist pricing and therefore would be willimpact good, the problem of equity is encouning to accept the equity effects of the markets. tered, and the justification for government interSamuelson calls this "Robin-Hood" pricing. In vention is strengthened. However, increased addition, a greater loss in welfare may occur marginal risk deduction between nonparticipants through market intervention than the net gain in and participants results in additional complicawelfare resulting from such action (Coase; tions in stating that a regulated market for pest Bator) .
information is required for efficiency. Thus, The argument for government intervention further research is required before the conclusion into market for information is further weakened is made that pest information should be provided. when risk preference is considered, case four. As by a governmental agency.
